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DEFERENTIAL DILEMMAS: PINHOLSTER V. 
AYERS AND FEDERAL HABEAS CLAIMS  
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF  
COUNSEL AFTER AEDPA 
Abstract: On December 9, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sit-
ting en banc, concluded that Scott Lynn Pinholster had received defi-
cient, prejudicial assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital 
case, vacating an earlier decision by a panel of the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. 
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether this 
was an appropriate application of both Strickland v. Washington and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Comment ar-
gues that the latter en banc majority opinion more effectively ensures that 
capital defendants such as Pinholster are permitted to vindicate their 
Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel because the po-
sition advocated by the dissent would largely erode these fundamental 
constitutional protections. 
Introduction 
 In April 1984, following a lengthy trial, a jury convicted Scott Lynn 
Pinholster of two counts of first-degree murder and found him eligible 
for the death sentence.1 His court-appointed counsel, astonished to 
learn that the prosecution planned to offer aggravating evidence at the 
penalty phase, admitted to the judge that they had not yet prepared a 
mitigation case.2 Nevertheless, Pinholster’s counsel then declined a 
continuance, determining that the additional time would not “make a 
great deal of difference” to Pinholster’s sentence.3 At the penalty 
phase, Pinholster’s counsel waived opening statement; provided no 
medical or psychiatric testimony regarding Pinholster’s childhood 
brain injury, deprived childhood, family history of criminal activity, and 
mental illness; and presented only one witness, whose testimony was 
                                                                                                                      
1 Pinholster v. Ayers (Pinholster III ), 590 F.3d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. 
granted sub nom. Cullen v. Pinholster, 78 U.S.L.W 3549 (U.S. June 14, 2010) (No. 09-1088). 
2 See id. at 671. 
3 Id. 
121 
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“brief[,] . . . damaging, incomplete, and inaccurate.”4 The jury deliber-
ated for two days before returning a death sentence.5 
                                                                                                                     
 After the California Supreme Court upheld Pinholster’s conviction 
on direct appeal and later denied his two state habeas petitions that 
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases 
of his trial, Pinholster brought a habeas petition in federal district 
court.6 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Pin-
holster’s petition with respect to the guilt phase but found that counsel 
had performed deficiently at the penalty phase, concluding that Pin-
holster was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.7 On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion regarding the guilt 
phase but reversed the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel re-
garding the penalty phase.8 After rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment.9 
 Sitting en banc, the judges of the Ninth Circuit were divided with 
respect to two primary points: (1) whether the federal courts had been 
sufficiently deferential to the state courts in permitting an evidentiary 
hearing on Pinholster’s federal habeas corpus petition, and (2) whether 
the analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel was sufficiently deferen-
tial to Pinholster’s counsel under the appropriate standard as articu-
lated in 1984 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.10 
 Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and proce-
dural history of Pinholster’s underlying criminal case.11 Part II then 
explores the competing interpretations of deference with which the 
Ninth Circuit grappled en banc.12 Finally, Part III argues that the en 
banc majority’s interpretation of deference is most appropriate and 
best serves the spirit of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
representation.13 A contrary interpretation, such as the argument fur-
thered by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent in the case, would not 
only render Strickland a meaningless standard but would also eviscerate 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 659. 
6 Id. at 659–60. 
7 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 654–55. 
8 See id. at 655. 
9 Id. at 684. 
10 See id. at 662–64, 684–85; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
11 See infra notes 15–58 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 59–94 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
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the constitutional safeguards that serve as an essential check on capital 
punishment in the United States.14 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
A. The Guilt Phase of the Underlying Case 
 Pinholster was charged with the 1982 murders of Thomas Johnson 
and Robert Beckett, as well as burglary and robbery charges arising out 
of the same incident.15 At the guilt phase of Pinholster’s trial, the jury 
heard testimony from Art Corona, one of Pinholster’s accomplices, who 
testified as part of a plea arrangement.16 Corona explained that on the 
night of the murders, he, Pinholster, and David Brown robbed a house 
belonging to Michael Kumar, a local drug dealer who was then out of 
town.17 Unbeknownst to the three accomplices, however, Kumar had 
arranged for Johnson and Beckett to serve as house-sitters to take care 
of his property during his absence.18 In the midst of the robbery, the 
two house-sitters arrived and attempted to thwart Pinholster and his 
accomplices.19 Pinholster and Brown drew knives during the confronta-
tion, fatally stabbing Beckett and Johnson.20 Pinholster, Brown, and 
Corona split the proceeds of the crime, which amounted to twenty-
three dollars and a fraction of an ounce of marijuana.21 
                                                                                                                     
 Several weeks later, Corona came forward and turned himself in to 
the police.22 Corona described what Pinholster had been wearing on 
the night of the crime, and a search of Pinholster’s apartment led the 
police to discover traces of human blood on the clothing matching Co-
 
14 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 685 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. At the time this Comment went to press, a divided U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit. Cullen v. Pinholster, No. 09-1088, slip op. at 1, 31 (U.S. Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1088.pdf. That the opinion of 
the Court garnered the unequivocal support of only four of the justices indicates that the 
factual circumstances under which relief would be appropriate remain unsettled. See id. 
The reversal of habeas relief in Pinholster’s case demonstrates the inadequacies—and 
inequities—of the current framework and illustrates the need for congressional action 
both to clarify the appropriate inquiry under the AEDPA and to bring it more into line 
with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment. See id. 
15 Pinholster v. Ayers (Pinholster III ), 590 F.3d 651, 654–56 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
16 See id. at 655–56; People v. Pinholster (Pinholster I ), 824 P.2d 571, 582, 607 (Cal. 1992). 
17 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 655. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 655–56. 
21 Id. at 656. 
22 Id. 
124 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
rona’s description.23 Pinholster was charged with the murders, as well 
as robbery and burglary.24 He received court-appointed counsel, whom 
he later fired, and endeavored to represent himself for several months 
before trial.25 After Pinholster reconsidered his decision to proceed in 
his own defense, Harry W. Brainard and Wilbur G. Dettmar were ap-
pointed to represent him for the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.26 
 At trial, Pinholster took the stand, boasting of his criminal past and 
attempting to defend himself by emphasizing his habit of committing 
similar crimes with guns, not knives.27 He also presented an alibi de-
fense, admitting to the burglary and robbery charges but denying any 
participation in the two murders.28 Pinholster’s counsel did not at-
tempt to introduce medical or psychiatric testimony to explain Pinhol-
ster’s brash and apparently remorseless demeanor on the witness 
stand.29 
judge denied Pinholster’s motion to exclude aggrava-
tion evidence.34 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Penalty Phase 
 At the close of the guilt phase of Pinholster’s trial, the jury re-
turned a guilty verdict, finding that two special circumstances necessary 
to consider imposing a death sentence had been satisfied.30 Under Cali-
fornia law, the prosecution is required to provide notice before seeking 
to present aggravation evidence at the penalty phase when seeking cap-
ital punishment.31 Brainard and Dettmar did not receive such notice, 
and assumed that this meant that the prosecution would not present 
aggravation evidence at sentencing.32 What Brainard and Dettmar 
failed to take into account, however, was that during Pinholster’s sev-
eral-month period of representing himself, the prosecution had given 
Pinholster actual notice of the intent to put on an aggravation case.33 
As a result, the 
 
23 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 656. 
24 Id. at 654. 
25 Id. at 657. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 656. 
28 Id. 
29 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 677. 
30 Id. at 656. 
31 Id. at 657 (citing Pinholster v. Ayers (Pinholster II ), 525 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008)); 
see Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 2008). 
32 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 657, 671. 
33 See id. at 657. 
34 Id. 
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 Pinholster’s counsel were thus less than a week away from sentenc-
ing, and frankly acknowledged to the judge that they had not begun to 
prepare a mitigation case.35 Although the judge had denied the motion 
to exclude aggravation evidence, he informed Pinholster’s counsel that 
he would grant a request for a continuance given the circumstances.36 
Brainard and Dettmar declined the judge’s offer, concluding that the 
extra time would not “make a great deal of difference” to the sentence 
Pinholster would ultimately receive.37 
 According to billing records, Brainard and Dettmar then spent six 
and a half hours preparing for the penalty phase of Pinholster’s trial.38 
They waived opening statement and presented Pinholster’s mother, 
Burnice Brashear, as the sole witness.39 The district court would later 
describe Brashear’s testimony as “brief[,] . . . damaging, incomplete, 
and inaccurate.”40 In addition, although Brashear’s testimony some-
what confusingly alluded to Pinholster’s epilepsy and childhood head 
trauma, Pinholster’s counsel declined to produce any medical or psy-
chiatric expert testimony, causing the prosecution to encourage the 
jury to ignore the existence of these factors.41 Nor did counsel explore 
the truth of Brashear’s account, accepting her version of events without 
seeking corroboration from Pinholster’s siblings or others who knew 
him well.42 As a result, the jury was not made aware of the circum-
stances of Pinholster’s deprived childhood, including the abuse he suf-
fered at the hands of his grandparents and stepfather; the connection 
between his childhood head trauma and his subsequent behavioral 
problems; and the large incidence of mental illness and criminal activ-
ity among his immediate family.43 In addition, Pinholster’s counsel 
failed to explain his erratic and unrepentant demeanor when testifying 
during the guilt phase of the trial.44 
 By contrast, the state supplied significant aggravation evidence, call-
ing eight witnesses to describe Pinholster’s lengthy criminal record and 
his behavioral problems while incarcerated.45 The prosecution also took 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 657, 671. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 671. 
38 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 658. 
39 Id. at 658, 671. 
40 Id. at 671. 
41 See id. at 671, 676. 
42 See id. at 658. 
43 See id. at 675–80. 
44 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 677. 
45 See id. at 657, 660; Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 752. 
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advantage of the lack of psychiatric or medical testimony to convince 
the jury that such diagnoses were false, commenting that had Pinholster 
really been mentally ill, “a doctor would have been brought in” to ex-
plain Pinholster’s condition to the jury.46 The trial court instructed the 
jury to impose a death sentence if it determined that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.47 After two and 
a half days of deliberation, the jury returned a death sentence.48 
 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed Pinhol-
ster’s sentence.49 Pinholster next filed habeas petitions at the state 
level, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel had 
been violated by Brainard and Dettmar’s deficient, prejudicial per-
formance.50 The court initially ordered a show-cause hearing on the 
penalty phase allegations, then abruptly reversed course and denied his 
petition “on the substantive ground that it is without merit.”51 A subse-
quent state habeas petition was denied with the same language.52 
                                                                                                                     
 Having exhausted his state remedies, Pinholster next turned to the 
federal courts for habeas relief.53 The district court granted his request 
for an evidentiary hearing, at which point evidence of Pinholster’s or-
ganic brain damage, traumatic and abusive childhood, substance abuse, 
and family history of mental illness and criminal behavior was finally 
presented.54 The district court denied Pinholster’s claim of ineffective 
assistance at the guilt phase but found that his counsel’s performance 
at sentencing was sufficiently deficient and prejudicial to constitute in-
effective assistance, and the court granted Pinholster’s petition accord-
ingly.55 A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling 
with respect to the guilt phase but reversed the ruling of ineffective as-
sistance at the penalty phase, concluding that counsel’s performance 
was not deficient under Strickland and that California’s denial of Pin-
holster’s state habeas petition was therefore not an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law.56 Following a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s decision after determining that 
 
46 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 676. 
47 Pinholster I, 824 P.2d at 627. 
48 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 659. 
49 Pinholster I, 824 P.2d at 631. 
50 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 659–60. 
51 Id. at 659. 
52 See id. at 660. 
53 Id. at 659–60, 669. 
54 Id. at 660–62. 
55 Id. at 661. 
56 See Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 773. 
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Brainard and Dettmar’s performance at Pinholster’s sentencing was 
both deficient and prejudicial.57 The U.S. Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on June 14, 2010.58 
                                                                                                                     
II. Competing Interpretations of Deference 
A. Deference to the State Court Under AEDPA 
 As a threshold matter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit grappled with the question of whether Pinholster’s habeas corpus 
petition was properly before the federal courts.59 The Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) severely circum-
scribes federal habeas relief following state court adjudications, noting 
that in general it “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” except in two 
exceptional circumstances.60 Where “the adjudication of the claim . . . 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States,” however, such claims may be heard 
by federal courts.61 The en banc majority concluded that the California 
Supreme Court’s “postcard” denials of Pinholster’s habeas petitions 
constituted an unreasonable application of federal law.62 
B. Deference to Attorneys Under Strickland 
 The AEDPA’s severe restrictions on federal habeas petitions under 
section 2254(d) require that federal courts look to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s pronouncements on the subject to ascertain whether the state 
court’s decision was an unreasonable application of such law.63 The 
Supreme Court articulated the standard for claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington in 1984.64 In Strickland, the 
Court established a two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, requiring the petitioner to prove both that (1) counsel’s perform-
 
57 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 684. 
58 Cullen v. Pinholster, 78 U.S.L.W 3549 (U.S. June 14, 2010) (No. 09-1088). 
59 Pinholster v. Ayers (Pinholster III ), 590 F.3d 651, 662–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
61 § 2554(d)(1). The second exception, set forth in § 2554(d)(2), applies when a deci-
sion is “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented in the State court proceeding.” § 2554(d)(2). 
62 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 684. 
63 See § 2554(d)(1). 
64 See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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ance was objectively deficient, and (2) there was a reasonable probabil-
ity that the deficient performance was prejudicial.65 With concerns 
about “the distorting effects of hindsight” clouding assessments of per-
formance, the Strickland court made clear that this standard was to be 
highly deferential, with a strong but rebuttable presumption that coun-
sel’s performance was not deficient.66 
 The Ninth Circuit en banc majority concluded that Pinholster had 
overcome this presumption, finding that Brainard’s and Dettmar’s per-
formance at sentencing was deficient even under a highly deferential 
standard.67 In particular, the majority relied on recent Supreme Court 
cases in which Strickland’s highly deferential standard was met.68 For in-
stance, in Terry Williams v. Taylor, decided in 2000, the Supreme Court 
determined that the petitioner’s attorneys’ failure to investigate and in-
troduce mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was unconstitutionally 
deficient and prejudicial representation under Strickland.69 Similarly, in 
Porter v. McCollum, decided in 2009, the Court concluded that a defen-
dant received ineffective assistance following inadequate investigation 
into mitigating evidence.70 Wiggins v. Smith, decided in 2003, and Rom-
pilla v. Beard, decided in 2005, both involved a Supreme Court finding 
that counsel’s performance did not meet prevailing norms and was 
prejudicial, with analogous failures to conduct sufficient investigations.71 
 The majority’s criticisms of Pinholster’s representation at sentenc-
ing similarly focused on the inadequacy of the investigation into his 
background for potentially mitigating evidence, as well as the failure to 
glean further information about the mitigating evidence brought to 
their attention by the defendant’s mother, Burnice Brashear.72 As later 
investigations would reveal, Brainard’s and Dettmar’s decision to rely 
exclusively on Brashear’s testimony for mitigation resulted in a mislead-
ing and incomplete defense penalty case.73 For instance, although 
Brashear indicated that Pinholster was particularly deviant as compared 
to his siblings and his other relatives, subsequent investigation revealed 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. at 687; Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 663–64. 
66 See 466 U.S. at 689. 
67 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 669–74. 
68 See id. at 665; see, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452–56 (2009) (per cu-
riam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381–83, 390–93 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 523–38 (2003); Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–99 (2000). 
69 See Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 395–99. 
70 See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 452–56. 
71 See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390–93; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–26, 534–38. 
72 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 675–80. 
73 See id. 
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that his father and several of his siblings had severe mental illnesses and 
serious criminal histories.74 Moreover, Brashear’s descriptions of Pin-
holster’s childhood were suspiciously self-serving and dismissive of the 
abuse Pinholster’s other relatives recall him suffering at the hands of 
his grandparents and stepfather throughout his childhood.75 Also lack-
ing from counsel’s presentation was any medical or psychiatric evidence 
to contextualize Pinholster’s jarring behavior on the stand or his 
lengthy criminal record.76 The majority placed some significance on 
the jury’s lengthy two-day deliberations, interpreting this as an indica-
tion of their reluctance to impose death even in the face of the dearth 
of mitigation evidence presented.77 
 Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent presents a dramatically divergent 
application of Strickland, casting Pinholster’s attorneys’ performance in 
a far more forgiving light than the majority.78 This disagreement 
stemmed in part from his interpretation of Brainard’s and Dettmar’s 
billing records, suggesting that they were not diligent in their timekeep-
ing and must have spent more than the six and a half hours reflected in 
their records,79 although counsel’s own recollections of their perform-
ance did not corroborate this interpretation.80 In addition, Chief Judge 
Kozinski disagreed with the majority about counsel’s likely motivation 
for approaching sentencing as they did, arguing that counsel may have 
made a strategic choice to use a “family sympathy” defense rather than 
attempt the more modern defense of “humanizing” Pinholster, and 
then opted to “fall[] on [their] swords” at postconviction proceed-
ings.81 The en banc majority, however, anticipated and rejected Chief 
Judge Kozinski’s argument.82 In the majority’s view, “the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of effective counsel . . . would be rendered meaning-
less if every attorney who is unable to explain his ineffective assistance 
is assumed to be effective because he is ‘falling on his sword.’”83 In ad-
dition, the majority rejected Chief Judge Kozinski’s argument that 
Brainard and Dettmar knowingly elected to pursue a line of defense—
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 659, 661. 
75 See id. at 660–61, 672, 678–79. 
76 See id. at 677. 
77 See id. at 680, 684. 
78 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 691–92 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
79 See id. at 697–701. 
80 See id. at 658 (majority opinion). 
81 See id. at 692, 701 n.10, 707 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
82 See id. at 673 (majority opinion). 
83 Id. at 672–73 n.10. 
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“family sympathy” —that has since become outmoded.84 Under the ma-
jority’s view, the question of deference to counsel’s professional judg-
ment is not without limits, and depends on the adequacy of counsel’s 
investigation into other possible defenses.85 For a trial strategy to con-
stitute a reasonable professional judgment call, counsel would have had 
to have at least considered the alternatives, which was not possible here 
“[g]iven the absence of a minimally adequate defense investigation.”86 
With no such investigation into Pinholster’s background to reveal other 
mitigating evidence, the majority rejected Chief Judge Kozinski’s con-
clusion that counsel made a reasonable tactical decision.87 
 A final point of contention between the majority and the dissent 
was the propriety of the evidentiary hearing allowed by the district 
court in response to Pinholster’s ineffective assistance of counsel ha-
beas petition, as it introduced evidence not heard by the state courts.88 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that: 
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a 
claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows 
that— 
 (A) the new claim relies on— 
 (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cas-
es on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable; or 
 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.89 
The en banc majority did not conclude that this provision was problem-
atic—or even applicable—in Pinholster’s case, because Pinholster was 
diligent in developing the factual record at the state level to the best of 
his ability.90 Indeed, Pinholster had almost achieved this goal with his 
first state habeas petition; the state court, however, withdrew its show-
cause order as “improvidently granted” before Pinholster could sup-
                                                                                                                      
84 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 673. 
85 See id.; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 
1069, 1107–09 (2009) (describing the sources of law used to determine the reasonableness 
of counsel’s failure to investigate and uncover mitigation evidence in capital cases). 
86 Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 673, 680. 
87 See id. at 673–74. 
88 See id. at 666–69. 
89 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006). 
90 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 666–69. 
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plement the factual record in state court.91 Chief Judge Kozinski in dis-
sent interpreted Section 2254(e) in a light much less favorable to Pin-
holster’s claim, finding that a strict interpretation did not permit devel-
opment of the factual record even under these circumstances.92 The en 
banc majority, however, found support for its position in Michael Wil-
liams v. Taylor, decided by the Supreme Court in 2000, noting that “the 
clear import of Michael Williams is . . . that any new evidence admissible 
either under § 2254(e)(2) or because the petitioner did not exhibit a 
lack of diligence in state court, is pertinent to the petitioner’s claims 
under AEDPA.”93 In the majority’s assessment, “[b]ecause Pinholster 
was diligent, the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are inapplica-
ble.”94 
                                                                                                                     
III. The Case Against an Overly Deferential Standard 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit en banc majority’s 
analysis in the 2010 decision Pinholster v. Ayers better comports with the 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment without compromising congres-
sional intent as articulated in the AEDPA.95 Interpreting the AEDPA in 
an overly broad manner so as to prohibit Pinholster from challenging 
his death sentence, as Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Pinholster advo-
cates, would be a radical departure from the Supreme Court’s modern 
death penalty jurisprudence.96 Under similar reasoning in applying the 
Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has recently held unconstitu-
tional capital punishment when applied to juveniles,97 the mentally 
challenged,98 and the insane.99 Such conclusions can be seen as part of 
a larger trend toward critically analyzing the appropriateness of death 
 
91 See id. at 659. 
92 See id. at 685, 687 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 667 (majority opinion) (citing Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437–44 
(2000)). 
94 Id. at 668 (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004)). 
95 See Pinholster v. Ayers (Pinholster III ), 590 F.3d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
See generally Steven Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994) (noting the practical inadequacies of the inef-
fective assistance of counsel standard); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to 
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1731 (2005) (describing the 
funding shortages and other institutional barriers to adequate representation of indigent 
criminal defendants under the Strickland standard). 
96 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–79 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 311–21 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–18 (1986). 
97 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
98 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
99 See Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 417–18. 
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sentences to ensure that they are applied only to the groups of offend-
ers who are fully culpable.100 Tellingly, the en banc majority in Pinholster 
cons
 deter-
rported to—or would be constitutionally permitted 
“humanize” Pinholster and diminish his culpability in at least one of 
                                                                                                                     
idered this argument in concluding that the court’s 
paramount concern is not whether few death sentences are 
safe from federal judges, . . . but rather that federal judges ac-
knowledge . . . the uniqueness of the punishment of death 
[and] the corresponding . . . need for reliability in the
mination that death is the appropriate punishment.101 
 Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissenting view would yield the perverse 
result of barring Pinholster from challenging his death sentence for 
failing to develop the factual record.102 Pinholster was prevented from 
so doing, however, because the state court specifically reversed course 
and declined to give Pinholster the opportunity to present factual evi-
dence in state court.103 Moreover, Chief Judge Kozinski’s approach 
would reject virtually all claims of ineffective assistance by setting the 
standard for deference impossibly high.104 This is not the position tak-
en by the Supreme Court in its most recent ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases.105 By setting the standard at an unattainable level, Chief 
Judge Kozinski’s approach would effectively strip state prisoners of their 
ability to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights, which is far more 
than the AEDPA pu
to—accomplish.106 
 Chief Judge Kozinski would defer to counsel’s “family sympathy” 
defense strategy as a reasonable technique, even in the face of evidence 
that counsel did not pursue any alternative strategies that would take 
advantage of the wealth of mitigation evidence that would serve to 
 
100 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 676–77. 
101 See id. at 684 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (internal quota-
tions omitted))). 
102 See id. at 685(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
103 See id. at 668 (majority opinion). 
104 See id. at 668, 673 n.10; see also Bright, supra note 95, at 1860–65 (explaining why an 
overly deferential standard, coupled with increasingly strict rules governing the preserva-
tion of issues for appellate review, essentially rewards ineffective counsel’s negligence by 
barring appellate review of the most egregious cases). 
105 See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452–56 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla 
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381–83, 390–93 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523–38 
(2003); Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–99 (2000). 
106 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 685 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). See generally Bright, su-
pra note 95. 
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the twelve jurors’ minds.107 Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissenting argument 
would undoubtedly be more persuasive were there any evidence of a 
“minimally adequate defense investigation.”108 In the absence of such 
an investigation, however, deference should not excuse attorneys from 
ignoring basic professional obligations at the expense of their clients.109 
The Supreme Court has not been inclined to view with approval bald 
pleas for clemency where adequate investigation would have yielded a 
legitimate mitigation case.110 
Conclusion 
 Pinholster’s representation at the penalty phase of his trial was de-
ficient by any metric, and his counsel’s performance unquestionably 
prejudiced his defense. Applying a formalistic and impossibly high 
standard to federal habeas claims of ineffective assistance by encasing 
such claims in Chief Judge Kozinski’s impenetrable “double layer of 
deference” would prevent federal courts from exercising a fundamental 
check on the capital sentencing process: ensuring that defendants in 
capital cases receive adequate, effective representation. Pinholster’s 
counsel did not live up to this standard, and there was a very real possi-
bility that at least one of the members of the jury weighing the aggra-
vating and mitigating evidence would have voted not to impose a death 
sentence had they heard an adequate defense on Pinholster’s behalf, 
satisfying the conditions set forth under Strickland. As a result, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s dismissal of Pinholster’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel habeas claim was contrary to established U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, and the en banc majority’s conclusion was accord-
ingly the appropriate resolution. 
Katherine A. McAllister 
 
 
Preferred citation: Katherine A. McAllister, Comment, Deferential Dilemmas: Pinholster v. Ayers 
and Federal Habeas Claims for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After AEDPA, 52 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 
121 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/10_mcallister.pdf. 
 
107 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 692 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at 537 (stating that prejudice is established if “there is a reasonable probability that at least 
one juror would have struck a different balance” had he or she heard the mitigation evi-
dence). 
108 See Pinholster III, 590 F.3d at 680. 
109 See id. at 673, 680. 
110 See id. at 680 (quoting Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393). 
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